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Introduction 
A. The Statute 
Here is the problem, as Congress saw it:, A distributor of televi-
sion programming (a cable television operator or a distributor of tele-
vision programming via other media) cannot thrive unless it can 
supply viewers with top-rated programming. Few customers want to 
subscribe to a service that lacks NBC's Seinfeld, the latest episodes of 
General Hospital, or even PBS educational documentaries. Special 
provisions in the 1976 Copyright Act gave cable operators some lib-
erty to retransmit broadcast programming.1 However, that Act cre-
ated no such liberties for programming originating from within cable 
companies. Because the national market for programming is domi-
nated by a few large cable operators, smaller distributors-such as di-
rect broadcast satellites (DBS) and multichannel, multipoint 
distribution services (MMDS) (wireless cable)-may find it difficult to 
obtain permission to show popular programming that originates from 
their large competitors. 
Congress' fear was that big cable operators typically demand that 
programming vendors enter into exclusive contracts with them. A 
vendor of a popular program would thereby agree not to sell its pro-
gram to anyone else. This would leave small distributors with access 
to less valuable stock-in-trade, ·and potentially leave cable television 
customers in some areas without the shows they want to watch. (Also, 
for those customers who refused to hook up to cable services· with 
paltry offerings, it could leave them with a few, static-filled broa~casts 
1. With certain qualifications 17 U.S.C. § lll(c)(l) requires that: 
[S]econdary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a primary transmis-
sion 'made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Ccim-
mis~ion or by an appropriate governmental authority of Canada or Mexico and 
embodying a performance or display of a work shall be subject to compulsory 
licensing upon compliance with the requirements of subsection ( d) where the car-
riage of the signals comprising the secondary transmission is permissible under 
the rules, regulations, or authorizations of the Federal Communications 
Commission. ' 
17 U.S.C. § lll(c)(l) (1988). Ironically,§ 6 of the 1992 Cable Act, entitled "Retransmis-
sion Consent for Cable Systems," places a limitation on the compulsory license grlmted by 
17 U.S.C. § 111 by giving local broadcasting stations a right to refuse consent to retransmis-
sion of their signals by multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs).' Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, § 6, 106 Stat. 1482 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (Supp. IY 1992)). 
But cf id. § 6(2)(b )(6) (no change to 17 U.S.C. § 111 intended). In this instaqce,.therefore, 
the 1992 Cable Act strengthens (makes more exclusive) the rights of copyright proprietors. 
However, "retransmission consent" exists side by side with the § 111 compulsory license; 
cable operators typically only pay for the compulsory license, while the retransmission con-
sent is usually worked out through barter. Conversation with Michael Botein (Nov. 14, 
1994) (discussing retransmission consent). 
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if anything at all.) Furthermore, of course, because large cable opera-
tors might buy up all the most popular programs, Congress feared that 
freedom from competition could allow them to demand outrageous 
prices from television-hungry consumers. 
Another concern played a role as well. Small or independent 
programming vendors-including the distributors or creators of inno-
vative, out-of-the-mainstream programs-may have difficulty entering 
the cable programming market as it is currently structured. Many 
cable operators have a financial interest in larger vendors, and, quite 
naturally, show preference in their carriage choices for their affiliates. 
With the television market dominated by a few powerful vendors, in-
dependent creators of programming might be unable to reach the 
public; and Congress worried that viewers would be denied access to a 
sufficiently diverse spread of televised viewpoints.2 
Congress responded to these and other fears with the passage of 
the 1992 Cable Act.3 Most attention has been directed to the 1992 
Cable Act's "must-carry" provisions.4 Less well known, but equally 
interesting are the 1992 Cable Act's "must-license" or "mandated ac-
cess" provisions.5 These provisions attempt to promote competition 
and diversity in the distribution of programming by making it easier 
for small or unaffiliated distributors to obtain licenses at n~ndiscrimi­
natory rates for programming that otherwise might be reserved solely 
to the use of dominant or vertically-integrated distributors. These 
2. One of Congress' primary concerns was with the public's access to informational 
and entertainment programming (including "marquee programming" such as recent-re-
lease 'movies) which might not otherwise have been available. The concern was great 
enough that the provision with which this Article primarily deals-§ 19, discussed below-
was added to the 1992 Cable Act on the floor_ of the House (rather than being a standard 
product of the committee process) and was subject to real discussion and scrutiny during 
the fto9r debate. Conversation with Andrew Schwartzman (Nov. 17, 1994) (discussing leg-
islative: history of the 1992 Cable Act). 
3.,; The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [here-
inafter :1992 Cable Act]. , 
4, :Tue "must-carry" provisions are contained in§ 4 of the 1992 Cable Act and were 
reviewed by the Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 
(1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 
(1994) (decision vacating lower court's grant of summary judgment to FCC, in case chal-
lenging constitutional validity of the must-carry provisions). 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, 
§ 4 (cod,ified at 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp: IV 1992)). , 
5. The "must-license" provisions are contained in §§ 12 and 19. Section 12 modifies 
Part II of Title VI of the Communications Act of 1934 by adding a new § 616; it is codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 536 (Supp. IV 1992) and implemented by the FCC at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76, subpt. 
Q (added pursuant to the 1992 Cable Act),§§ 76.1300-76.1302. Section 19 modifies Part II 
of Title VI of the Communications Act of 1934 by adding a new § 628; it is codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. IV 1992) and implemented by the FCC at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76, subpt. 0, 
§§ 76.1000~76.1003 (added) and §§ 76.1004-76.1010 (amended). 
228 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:225 
provisions prohibit certain exclusive licenses between cable operators 
and vendors, along with certain behavior that would effectively re-
strict carriage of programs to particular distributors. 
B. The Jurisprudential Issues 
Accordingly, one hears arguments that the constraints imposed 
by the must-license provisions illegitimately endanger vendors' prop-
erty rights in their programming. Specifically, the threatened jurispru-
dential conflict is the following: Prior to the 1992 Cable Act, 
programming vendors largely had the right to dispose of their pro-
grams as they would-they could sell them to whomever they desired, 
on terms that they chose6 (or at least, on the best terms they were able 
to negotiate). The 1992 Cable Act, however, constrains the vendors of 
cable programming in several important ways. They no longer have 
the right, in many instances, to enter into exclusive contracts for pro-
gramming. They must offer their programs for sale on "nondiscrimi-
natory" terms to smaller, independent programming distributors. 
Thus, the 1992 Cable Act narrows vendors' established property right 
in their programs.7 
One of the most important questions for the law to resolve over 
the next twenty years will be the issue of what importance should be 
given to a property owner's "right to say no." This Article provides an 
introduction not only to the must-license or mandated access provi-
sions but also to the sorts of issues that are raised by all such provi-
sions. We focus on how the law should approach the question of who 
should decide whether a person's possessions are commensurable with 
money. 
6. Note, however that a copyright holder's rights are never fully exclusive. All rights 
granted by copyright are subject to various limitations. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). 
7. The property created by the Copyright Act includes among its aspects tlie exclu-
sive right to control the initial public performance of the copyrighted work on the airways. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1993) (definitions); id. § 106 (rights of a copyright' owner). 
Although the 1976 Copyright Act made broadcasters subject to compulsory license 
provisions under 17 U.S.C. § 111, those compulsory licenses only applied to retransmission, 
not initial transmission. Hence, the broadcaster could choose when to first expose a given 
work to the public. This right to control timing can be important, particularly when nation-
wide ·advertising campaigns are being planned for a given premier. The compulsory 
licenses imposed by the 1992 Cable Act's mandated access provisions (which are applicable 
to programming being distributed by cable companies, as distinguished from§ lll's focus 
on programming being broadcast over the air) are not so clearly limited to retransmission. 
It is conceivable that the 1992 Cable Act, too, will be interpreted to mandate licenses only 
for transmissions that occur after an initial exclusive transmission. However, the regula-
tions are silent on this point. 
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I 
Overview of the Mandated Access Provisions 
Section 12 ("Regulation of Carriage Agreements") aims to pre-
vent economically powerful cable operators (COs) and other mul-
tichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) from unfairly 
refusing to carry programming produced by programming vendors in 
which the CO has no financial· affiliation. Section 12 requires COs 
and MVPDs to deal fairly with financially independent programming 
vendors. In relevant part, Section 12 calls for the FCC to issue regula-
tions that: 
(1) ... prevent a [CO] or other [MVPD] from requiring a financial 
interest in a program service as a condition for carriage on one 
or more of such operator's systems; 
(2) ... prohibit a [CO] or other [MVPD] from coercing a video 
· programming vendor to provide, and from retaliating against 
such a vendor for failing to provide, exclusive rights against 
other [MVPDs] as a condition of carriage on a system; 
(3) ... prevent [an MVPD] from engaging in conduct the effect of 
which is to unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated 
... vendor ... to compete fairly by discriminating in video pro-
gramming distribution on the basis of affiliation or nonaffilia-
tion of vendors in the selection, terms, or conditions for carriage 
of video programming provided by such vendors .... 8 
Thus, Section 12 imposes three very general limitations on the behav-
ior of an MVPD with respect to a programming vendor. First, an 
MVPD cannot require as a condition of program carriage that a ven-
dor give the MVPD a financial interest in its operation.9 Second, an 
MVPD cannot coerce a vendor into signing away exclusive rights to 
the pi;:ogramming offered for carriage. Third, an MVPD cannot act in 
any way that would unreasonably hinder an independent vendor from 
competing fairly. 
Section 12's language, in many aspects, mimics that of long~estab­
lished and relatively uncontroversial legislation in the antitrust and 
consumer protection fields. Though Section 12 does not abrogate any 
existing antitrust remedy, it has been suggested that a primary pur-
pose of Section 12 is to give plaintiffs a speedier, less expensive rem-
edy-. ~:hrough Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
8. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(l)-(3) (Supp. IV 1992). 
9. In other words, an MVPD may not require "vertical integration" as a condition of 
carrying a vendor's programming. For brevity, we will use the phrase "vertically integrated 
vendor" to indicate a vendor in which an MVPD has a financial interest and the phrase 
"vertically integrated MVPD" to indicate an MVPD that has a financial interest in a ven-
dor. Vertically integrated vendors and MVPDs are distinguished, of course, from vendors 
and MVPDs that are financially independent, and, presumably, less powerful 
economically. 
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administr:ative proceedings-than is available via in-court antitrust lit-
igation.10 Nevertheless, because the FCC has specifically declined to 
delineate exactly which activities Section 12 prohibits, 11 it is possible 
that the implementation of Section 12 could have implications for 
property-rights jurisprudence. Butthe more pressing concern is a par-
ticular subpart of Section 19. 
Section 19 of the 1992 Cable Act, "Development of Competition 
and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution," is targeted more 
specifically at particular practices in which both MVPDs and vendors 
might engage. Subsection (c) outlines the "Minimum Contents of 
Regulations" that the FCC must issue. In paraphrase, these prohibi-
tions are the following: 
(A) A CO with a financial interest in a vendor12 may not unduly or 
improperly influence that vendor's decision to sell programming to 
an MVPD that is not vertically integrated. 
(B) A vendor in which a CO has a fi.n"ancial interest cannot discrim-
inate in the sale of programming to other MVPDs (with certain ex-
ceptions, e.g., in setting prices, a vendor is allowed to take into 
account reasonable differences in the cost of providing program-
ming to different MVPDs). 
Perhaps most controversially: 
(C) A programming vendor anda CO may no longer enter into ex-
clusive contracts for programming; nor may they engage in any be-
10. Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM/ 
ENT L.J. 305 (1993): 
Indeed, the types of practices prohibited in sections 628(b) and (c), including an-
ticompetitive refusals to deal, price discrimination, and monopolization, have 
been illegal since the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, if 
not before under comm'on law. It follows that the 1992 Cable Act, if it is to make 
any sense as a matter of policy, is intentionally designed to reduce the transaction 
costs and shift the burden of proof to enhance the ability of cable competitors to 
obtain relief from monopolistic conduct. 
Id. at 326 (citations omitted). 
11. Rather, the FCC reports: . 
With respect to the prohibitions set forth in section 616(a)(1)(3) (1992 Cable Act, 
Section 12), we will define terms such as 'coercion' and 'discrimination' progres-
sively through the case law developed by resolving section 616 complaints, be-
cause the practices at issue will necessarily involve behavior that must be 
evaluated within the context of specific facts pertaining to each negotiation. 
Cable Act of 1992-Program Distribution and Carriage Agreements, Second Report and 
Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 60390, 60391 (1993) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76) (includes report 
adopting final rule pursuant to § 12). 
The Commission has recently issued further action regarding Unfair or Discriminatory 
Practices in the Sale of Video Programming (Rpt. No. DC-2680), FCC News, Nov. 10, 1994, 
but unfortunately these materials became available after this Article went to press. 
12. For simplicity, the authors use the general term "vendor" here. In contrast to § 12, 
however,§ 19 generally refers more specifically to a "satellite cable programming vendor" 
or a "satellite broadcast programming vendor." 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 19 (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 548(i)(2), 548(i)(4) (Supp. IV 1992)). 
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havior that would prevent (another) MVPD from obt;iining 
programming from any vertically-integrated vendor; when distribu-
tion to areas not served by a CO is at issue.13 
(D) A CO and a vendor in which that CO has a financial interest 
may no longer enter into exclusive contracts for programming, unless 
the FCC decides that such a contract would be in the "public inter-
est."14 This prohibition applies even when distribution to areas now 
served by a CO is at issue. 
231 
Thus, while Section 12, among its other provisions, prohibits COs 
from coercing vendors to enter into exclusive programming contracts 
as a condition of carriage, Section 19 goes farther; it prohibits COs 
and vendors in certain circumstances from voluntarily entering into 
exclusive programming contracts. It is this latter provision which is 
most intriguing from a jurisprudential perspective. 
Note that the prohibitions on exclusive contracts for program-
ming applies to a limited class of industry actors. Where distribution 
to areas unserved by cable is involved, the prohibition applies to all 
COs and vendors; where distribution to served areas is affected, how-
ever, the prohibition applies only to COs and vendors that are finan-
cial affiliates. 
II 
Economic Rationale 
. Congress clearly believed that market distortions-including in-
sufficient competition-in the cable industry required the prohibitions 
of Sections 12 and 19. In Section 2 of the 1992 Cable Act ("Findings; 
Policy; Definitions"), the authors survey the history of the industry 
since its deregulation in the 1984 Act, finding that: 
For a variety of reasons, including local franchising requirements 
and the extraordinary expense of constructing ·more than one cable 
television system to serve a particular geographic area, most cable 
television subscribers have no opportunity to select between com-
peting cable systems. Without the presence of another multichannel 
video programming distributor, a cable system faces no local com-
petition. The result is undue market power for the cable operator as 
cqmpared to that of consumers and video programmers. 1 . 
Congress feared that unless it acted to correct this perceived lack of 
competition, the industry would generate an insufficient diversity of 
13. Specifically, this subsection applies to distribution to areas not served by a CO as 
of the date of § 19's enactment. Id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(C)). 
14. Under§ 19(c)(5), this prohibition (applicable to areas already served by cable) will 
be effective for only 10 years, unless the FCC decides that it "continues to be necessary to 
preserve and protect competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming." 
Id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(D)). 
15. Id., § 2(a)(2) (included in history at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (emphasis added)). 
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programming and consumers would have insufficient access to 
whatever programming was produced.16 Sections 12 and 19 respond 
to this perceived market distortion by making it easier for smaller op-
erators to purchase the well-known programs that consumers desire; 
. the congressional hope was that by the year 2002 (at which time the 
provisions of Section 19 will be vacated by its sunset provision17}, 
smaller operators would have become sufficiently established in the 
market for the 1992 Cable Act's regulations to be unnecessary. 
Of course, not all commentators would affirm Congress' market 
analysis. With regard to the specific prohibition on exclusive con-
tracting, the Bush Administration made it clear that it felt lack of 
competition was not a problem.18 The administration submitted this 
statement in opposition to the exclusivity prohibition: 
The Administration opposes the amendment to be offered by Rep. 
Tauzin concerning access to cable programs [i.e., the prohibition on 
exclusive contracting]. It would restrict the discretion of cable pro-
grammers in distributing their product. Exclusive distribution ar-
rangements are common in the entertainment industry and 
encourage the risk-taking needed to develop new programming. 
Requiring programming networks that are commonly owned with 
cable systems to make their product available to competing distribu-
tors could undermine the incentives of cable operators to invest in 
developing new programming. This would be to the long-term det-
riment of the American public. If competitive problems emerge in 
this area, they can and should be addressed under the existing anti-
trust laws.19 
Others who spoke during congressional debates felt that the prohibi-
tion on exclusivity went too far and that it would result in requiring 
program sales "to all comers at government-mandated wholesale 
prices, terms, and conditions."20 Ultimately, the accuracy of Con-
gress' judgment that market distortion causes industry actors to mis-
value cable programming remains to be seen. Moreover, because 
FCC regulations implementing the provisions of the 1992 Cable Act 
neglect to lay out, for example, exactly what prices will be considered 
"nondiscriminatory," the practical effect of the 1992 Cable Act on 
vendors is uncertain.21 
16. See, e.g., 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(6)-(9) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 
("Findings")), § 19(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548(a) ("Purpose")). 
17. 47 U.S.C. § 548 (adding subsection 628(c)(5) to the Communications Act of 1934). 
18. 138 CONG. REC. H6489 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (Statement of Administration 
Policy). 
19. Id. 
20. 138 CoNG. REc. H6504 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (statements of Reps. Manton and 
Richardson). 
21. For example, it is unknown whether cable operators will refuse to buy program-
ming from vendors who are prohibited from offering exclusivity provisions. Alternatively, 
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The Compensation Question 
By prohibiting the formation of exclusive contracts for program-
ming in certain circumstances, Section 19 will in those circumstances 
ultimately require the following of a vendor: If a vendor sells its pro-
gramming to a large cable operator, on whose business that vendor 
might depend for financial survival, it must in turn offer this program-
ming for sale to other MVPDs, presumably at reasonably competitive 
rates.22 In effect, then, for many programming vendors to remain in 
business, they will be legally required to license their intellectual prod-
ucts to all multichannel distributors.23 It is for this reason that the 
prohibitions in Section 19 are frequently referred to as must-license or 
mandated access. The mandated access provisions raise interesting 
questions about the extent to which the government may legitimately 
interfere with private property rights-in this case, vendors' right to 
sell programming to whomever they please. 
In effect, Congress was concerned with two types of barriers to 
entry. On one hand, there was the possibility that small distributors 
could not enter the field of distributing top-rung programs for reasons 
unrelated to their being equipped to do the job of distribution. On 
the other hand, there was the possibility that program vendors and 
creators could not sell their material to the established players in cable 
television, for reasons unrelated to the programs' merit. It was as if 
Congress wanted to force a dis-aggregation of the various financial 
and property interests at play, so that each could find its highest-val-
ued use. Ironically, Congress chose a method which is inconsistent 
with the usual method of encouraging resources to fl.ow to their high-
est-valued uses-namely, the maintenance of strong property rights. 
Using the language of Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed,24 
we characterize the transformation in rights envisioned by the 1992 
Cable Act as follows: Prior to the 1992 Cable Act, copyright owners' 
interests in their products were governed by a "property" rule-i.e., 
programmers had an exclusive right to refuse to sell their product to 
any operator they chose. In other words, programmers had a veto 
if operators do keep buying, will prices be lowered drastically? Will the FCC in fact be 
forced to set prices to keep vendors afloat? See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
22. For more on the rates at which vendors may sell to other MVPDs, see supra notes 
20-21 and accompanying text. 
23. Or, perhaps, all reasonable comers-again, see supra notes 20-21 and accompany-
ing text for a more detailed discussion of possible limits on the types of licenses vendors 
may be forced to enter. 
24. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
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power over the sale of their products. In contrast, the provisions of 
the 1992 Cable Act eliminate that "property rule" protection and (in-
sofar as the 1992 Cable Act's provisions apply) leave programmers 
protected by a mere "liability" rule: They lose their veto power, 
although they retain the right to be paid for the use of their product 
by purchasers. 
The transformation of "property rules" into "liability rules" is 
usually explored in economic terms. In their classic article, Calabresi 
and Melamed consider the "invisible hand" assumption an initial as-
signment of entitlements, or property rights, that will inevitably yield 
an efficient distribution of those entitlements. (In the cable television 
arena, this Smithian analysis25 would suggest that leaving exclusive 
control of programming rights to vendors would yield optimal social 
outcomes.) In contrast, Calabresi and Melamed argue that certain 
types of market failure make it cheaper for the government to take 
over the task of valuing the resource in question by establishing a lia-
bility rule. Other property-rights scholars have argued in a similar 
vein.26 
However, the use of liability rules long pre-dates the law and eco-
nomics movement. Even the Constitution allows property to be 
"taken" against the owner's will for a public purpose, so long as com-
pensation is paid in an amount deemed "just" by a governmental deci-
sionmaker. It is to this provision we now turn. 
If we assume that this compulsory sharing of intellectual property 
could constitute a "taking"27 for which the Fifth Amendment requires 
25. The "invisible hand" is usually credited to Adam Smith, but Smith himself noted 
the need for some regulation. In assessing the propriety of certain banking regulation, 
Smith noted that "those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might 
endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of 
all governments; of the most free, as well as of the most despotical." 2 ADAM SMITH, THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 308 (Edwin Canaan ed., 1937). 
26. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (explor-
ing both free copying and compulsory licenses as responses to market failure). See also 
Wendy Gordon, Property and Tort Responses to Failures in Markets for Intangibles, forth-
coming as Systemische und Fallbezogene Losungsarisiitze fiir Marktversagen bei lmmateri-
algutern [literally, Systemic and Case-by-Case Responses to Market Failures in Intangible 
Goods), in 0KONOMISCHE ANALYSE DES GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSCHTZES (Claus Ott & 
Hans-Bernd Sch!ifer eds., 1994) (English translation on file with author). For further ex-
ploration, see Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Prpperty, and the Right to Deny Copyright, 
68 Ctt1.-KENT L. REV. 675 (1993). . 
27. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade secrets constitute 
property protected by the Fifth Amendment's "takings" clause). Whether or not the man-
dated access provisions abrogation of exclusivity constitutes a "taking" could be debated. 
Compare Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (not a compensable "tak-
ing" for the state constitution to eliminate a landowner's right to exclude unwanted peti-
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"just" compensation be paid,28 compensation is a key issue. Yet, the 
1992 Cable Act provisions largely leave unanswered a crucial ques-
tion: How much money will change hands when programming is sub-
jected to a non-exclusivity mandate? Even the implementing 
regulations are completely silent on the issue of how much compensa-
tion should be paid to the copyright holders.29 
In assessing the compensation issue, a particularly intriguing con-
cern will be identifying the nature of the loss for which compensation 
might have to be paid. It is possible that the new provisions may have 
a very countable cost to program vendors. The price paid for several 
nonexclusive licenses may not equal the price that would have been 
paid for one exclusive license. 
Even putting aside the impact of such a shortfall, there may be a 
more intangible cost that goes unrecompensed. There may be ele-
ments of exclusivity that should not be tradeable in money at all.30 
tioners from his shopping center) with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (compensable "taking" to require the owner of an apartment building 
to allow a cable television company to install its equipment in the building). 
Note that similar issues were not raised as pressing by the 1976 Copyright Act's§ 111, 
which gave cable companies certain compulsory licenses to access broadcast signals. That 
section came into existence against a background where the Supreme Court had recently 
held that "the cable television industry did not have to pay royalties for its retransmission 
of over-the-air broadcast signals." MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT 
LAW 236 {1989). Therefore, there was no pre-existing exclusive right. The mandated ac-
cess provisions, however, affect pre-existing exclusive rights. 
28. In Midkiff, the United States Supreme Court approved in principle laws which 
used eminent domain to transfer real property from one private party to another, so that 
this aspect of the 1992 Cable Act (private/private transfers) is probably acceptable. Never-
theless,. the Court reserved the question of whether the state's compensation was just. Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
The Supreme Court has also addressed similar issues in an explicit intellectual prop-
erty context. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), the Court held that the 
federal government could "take" intellectual property in a way that redounded to the im-
mediate benefit of a private party {the owner's competitor) "[s]o long as the taking has a 
conceivable public character" including "allowing greater competition." Id. at 1014-15. 
This approach would seem to characterize the 1992 Cable Act's mandated access provi-
sions as being in the "public interest" so far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, leaving 
as a primary open question the amount of compensation. that might be owed. 
29. FCC Rules and Regs., 58 Fed. Reg. 60390, 60391 {1993) (to be codified at 47 
C.F.R. pt. 76) (includes report adopting final rule pursuant to§ 12); 58 Fed. Reg. 27,658-77 
(1993) (includes report adopting final rule implementing § 19). 
30. There is a growing array of legal literature on issues of incommensurability. See, 
e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 {1993); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 M1cH. L. REv. 779 {1994). 
For exploration of related issues, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DE-
FENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983) (suggesting that while money may be a good 
way to distribute some goods and services, other criteria will be more appropriate in other 
spheres); Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and its Constitutional Consequences, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1994) (arguing that whether or not all goods are truly incommensura-
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Perhaps in some circumstances, "the right to say no" is not equivalent 
to a "right to get the market price we think you would receive." Even 
the "highest price we can imagine" may not be equivalent to the lost 
"right to say no." 
IV 
Mandated Access· and "Property" 
The transformation of property rules into liability rules has 
gained increasing currency both in intellectual property law31 and in 
the common law,32 as courts have become more willing to grant "com-
pulsory licenses" to use what was formerly the property of another. 
This is a familiar practice in intellectual property law-a relevant fact, 
since what is at issue in mandated access is the abrogation of the ex-
clusive rights that the copyright laws give to authors in their works. 
So far the Supreme Court has not addressed whether there are 
any interests that should be immune even from compensated takings. 
In any event, it is fairly clear that intellectual property rights (such as 
a vendor's copyrighted programs) are not interests that the Court sees 
as entitled to such deference.33 It is true that Article I of our Consti-
tution speaks of giving Congress the power to grant rights that are 
"exclusive."34 In contrast, ·Congress and the courts have never 
imagined that the only rights that federal copyright law could grant 
would be rights of complete and utter exclusivity.35 
Even the first English copyright statute provided explicit limits on 
a copyright owner's exclusive rights over sale. Under the Statute of 
ble, there can be social utility in treating many as if they were); Jeremy Waldron, Fake 
Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 813 {1994). 
31. See, e.g., James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunc-
tions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 983, 992-97 (1990) (suggesting that even in cases where viola-
tion of right is proved and gives rise to monetary relief, free speech principles might 
warrant denying injunctive relief). This approach was implicitly endorsed by the Supreme 
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 n.10 {1994). 
32. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970). 
33. In Monsanto, the Supreme Court held that it would be a "taking" if the federal 
government obtained trade secrets under a promise of confidentiality and then allowed 
competitors to utilize the information contained in the trade secrets. 467 U.S. at 1013. The 
Court also held that these takings would not be actionable to the extent that the competi-
tors paid adequate compensation for the information. Id. Moreover, the Monsanto Court 
stated that no injunction would be available in advance to prohibit the taking-in other 
words, a taking of the sort at issue in that case was permissible, and money damages would 
be enough to compensate the former property owner. Id. at 1014-16. 
34. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
35. Of course, to call any right of ownership fully "exclusive" inevitably involves some 
overstatement. For example, the Second Circuit noted that copyright proprietors receive a 
right to benefits that might flow from a copyrighted work, but "not without limit." Berlin 
v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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Anne, anyone who wanted a book but disliked the price charged for it 
could ask the law to lower the price; certain governmentally-author-
ized officials were empowered to "settle the price" of books in a man-
ner "as to them shall seem Just and Reasonable."36 
The first United States copyright statute was also limited in that it 
only gave copyright proprietors the exclusive rights to "print, reprint 
and vend" their works-they had no rights over public performance.37 
Ironically, the rights to public performance-shared by all nonexclu-
sively in 1790-are precisely those rights that most concern the play-
ers in today's cable industry. 
Admittedly, the first American statute did not contain a posi-
tively formulated "must-sell" provision like that in the Statute of 
Anne. However, by 1909 United States copyright law had adopted a 
mandated access provision of its own, a compulsory license device still 
applicable today to certain classes of copyrighted works.38 For exam-
ple, once a musical work is made into a record and distributed, any 
musical group can produce a "cover" of that song-that is, the group 
can make its own rendition of the song on its own record-at a set 
license price and without needing the consent of the song's copyright 
proprietor.39 An even closer parallel to the 1992 mandated access 
provisions is the compulsory license grant made by 17 U.S.C. section 
lll(c)(l), allowing cable operators certain rights to retransmit the sig-
nal of a broadcasting station.40 Thus, Anglo-American copyright law 
has developed in the direction of allowing limitations on the "exclu-
sive right" of copyright proprietors. 
Moreover, the policy reasons underlying the 1992 Cable Act are 
consistent with the rationale historically expressed by lawmakers for 
decisions to reign in exclusive rights. The 19Q9 Congress grounded its 
compulsory license provisions for phonograph records in a fear of mo-
36. 8 Anne, ch. 19, para. 4 (1709) (Eng.). 
37. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1Stat.124. So, for example, the owner of copyright in 
a book could not prohibit someone from reading that book aloud to a mammoth audience. 
Admittedly, those rights that an early copyright owner did have could be a said to 
have been exclusive, but that is a contestable linguistic matter. For example, when in the 
nineteenth century a copyright owner was held incapable of asserting any rights over an 
abridgement prepared without his consent, that frustrated owner would be unlikely to have 
described his rights as "exclusive." 
38. As intimated supra note 27, in these situations in the past, compulsory licenses 
have come on board at the same time as the new right-as part of the legislative compro-
mise getting the new right included in the Copyright Act. They are, therefore, better au-
thorities for the 1992 Cable Act's prospective effects than as to its effects on already-
existing licenses. 
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988). 
40. See supra note 1. 
238 HASTINGS CoMM!ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:225 
nopoly and a desire to foster competition.41 Similarly, courts have 
since adopted compulsory licenses as a response to antitrust problems 
in patent law.42 Congress articulated analogous pro-competitive mo-
tives in passing the 1992 Cable Act.43 
As mentioned, there are also common-law examples of "property 
rules" being transformed into "liability rules." The most famous case 
is probably Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,44 in which the New York 
court refused to issue an injunction against a pollution-spewing ce-
ment plant, but the court did grant money damages to the plaintiffs. 
In effect, this award of damages (but refusal of injunctive relief) 
against a nuisance amounted to a compulsory license. Landowners 
around the cement plant were, in effect, forced to "license" part of 
their right to enjoy the air to the cement plant. 
These and similar developments have sometimes lead to the ad 
absurdum query: "What's next, a license to murder?"45 It is undoubt-
edly the perceived slippery slope of losing rights thought essential to 
personal security that raises emotions when dealing with provisions 
such as the 1992 Cable Act's new mandated access. However, more 
than habits of thought are at stake. Indeed, the essence of a "right" is 
arguably its capability of allowing the individual to stand against the 
majority; rights inevitably imply a sphere where individual will, rather 
than group welfare, is entitled to prevail. If that is so, a "right" cannot 
be a "right" in the strictest sense if it is. sold against the will of the 
holder.46 As the proportion of compulsory licenses and mandated ac-
41. See Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in 
Copyright Law, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 203, 206-07 (1982). 
42. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAw AND PoucY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
764, 906-08 (1992). 
43. For example, § 2 of the 1992 Cable Act outlines findings and policies, and the 
authors explicitly conclude: 
For a variety of reasons ... most cable television subscribers have no opportunity 
to select between competing cable systems. Without the presence of another mul-
tichannel video programming distributor, a cable system faces no local competi-
tion. The result is undue market power for the cable operator as compared to 
that of consumers and video programmers. 
1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 2(a)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 {Supp. IV 1992)). 
44. 26 N.Y.2d 219 {1970). Critics of Boomer include Daniel A. Farber. He writes: 
"Damage awards may compensate for the victim's economic loss, but a liability rule [i.e. a 
remedy that refuses to grant an injunction] slights the more fundamental injury to the 
victim's dignity as a member of the community." Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing Boomer: 
Justice, Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, in A PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 274, 277 (Richard H. 
Chused ed., 1993). 
45. See, e.g., Arthur Hoppe, A License to Steal, in EcoNOMIC FouNDATIONS OF PROP-
ERTY LAW 49 {Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975). 
46. Though compensation can provide some recognition to rights, compensation for a 
lost right is not the same thing as honoring that right in full. See Radin, supra note 30. 
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cess provisions grows, society may need a fundamental reconceptual-
ization of the notion of property. 
No one fears that "licenses to murder" will soon be sold by gov-
ernmental clerks. However, while American jurisprudence still gives 
fairly secure recognition to personal rights of bodily integrity, it gives 
somewhat less recognition to rights to be secure in one's enjoyment of 
property (like the nuisance right at issue in Boomer), and even less 
recognition to rights against. the copying of intangibles like 
programming. 
This may well be a desirable hierarchy. One can imagine a plausi-
ble rationale: each person has only one body and does not usually 
desire to subject it to commercial valuation; people have many pieces 
of physical property, and they are used to trading them; and, as for 
television programs, they are produced for trade, and can be infinitely 
reproduced without forcing the originator to forego the right of ac-
cess. Nevertheless, such a hierarchy-· which places some forms of in-
tellectual property at the most vulnerable position-deserves further 
scrutiny. The next section of this Article offers some preliminary 
guidelines for beginning that inquiry. 
v 
Commensurability Guidelines 
In determining whether an entitlement protected by a property 
rule should be protected inste&d by a liability rule, law and economics 
scholars generally inquire into whether factors are present that might 
impede voluntary market trades from occurring. These factors in-
clude elements such as high transaction costs and strategic behav-
iors.47 Scholars concerned· with the limitations of the economic 
perspective go beyond this, typically focusing on the type, category, or 
quality of the thing at stake (e.g., babies or bodily integrity) to ask "if 
this thing is appropriately traded on the market."48 As part of this 
inquiry, scholars frequently suggest reasons why trades in certain re-
sources are or should be forbidden.49 
47. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24. 
48. This has been my approach on occasion, too. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning 
Information, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 223, 257-58 (1992) (recommending that the tort of misap-
propriation be limited to intangibles suitable for trading and discussing criteria of market 
suitability). 
49. There is a growing literature on "inalienability." See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, 
supra note 24. Note that there can be degrees to which transfers are or should be blocked. 
For example, some things should not be transferred at all (such as one's vote), while some 
may be appropriately given away so long as no money changes hands (such as bodily 
organs). 
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These are indeed important aspects of the property rule puzzle. 
But they do not exhaust the issues at stake. Our concern here is with 
another part of the puzzle:50 protecting an entitlement holder's right 
to decide whether market deals51 are desired at all-including her 
right to decide whether market deals are only desired when coupled 
with some right of control.52 
We might call this concern with who decides the incommensura-
bility question a "process" issue, as distinguished from the substantive 
issue of categorizing a given resource as commensurable or not. Some 
things which our society may be happy to see traded, it might not be 
happy to see traded against the will of the owner. 
Here we will propose a set of tentative guidelines for approaching 
this issue of process. We will then use those guidelines to evaluate the 
1992 Cable Act's mandated access provisions. Essentially, our ques-
tion is whether, in this instance, any significant weight should be given 
to protecting a copyright proprietor's right to decide for herself 
whether her power to grant an exclusive contract is monetizable.53 
We argue that those observers who complain about the mandated ac-
cess provision on the ground that it undermines crucial rights of prop-
erty and human dignity are drastically overstating their case. So long 
as valid distinctions can be drawn among uses of liability rules, most 
dangers of the slippery slope can be averted. The next section sets 
forth criteria from which distinctions with "staying power" might be 
drawn. 
50. Recall the subtitle of the Calabresi & Melamed article, supra note 24: "One View 
of the Cathedral." It reminds us that just as Claude Monet could present only one view of 
Rouen Cathedral in any one canvas, theorists can do little more than present one perspec-
tive at a time. 
51. Note that our focus is not on the overall issue of commensurability, but rather on 
the narrower question of commensurability with money. We use the broader term ("com-
mensurability" rather than "monetizability") out of deference to the interesting literature 
that is crystallizing around "commensurability." See supra note 30. 
52. The same person who might be willing to sell a painting for $500 might be highly 
insulted if someone came and took it off her wall without permission, regardless of whether 
the thief left $500 scotch-taped to the wall in its place. 
53. Note that, even if protecting this interest were found to have significant impor-
tance,. that would not lead immediately to condemning the mandated access provision. As 
mentioned, the process issue is only part of the puzzle. Rather, if the process issue is 
resolved in the right-holder's favor, then an assessment would need to be done to deter-
mine what weight that factor has here, and the factor would need to be weighed against 
whatever reasons might favor this particular transformation from property rule to liability 
rule. 
But we do not attempt this final task; we will content ourselves with articulating a set 
of tentative guidelines for approaching the question of when an entitlement-holder's right 
to decide commensurability for herself is likely to have significance. 
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A. Preliminary Guidelines for Assessing "Process" Incommensurability 
Issues 
We suggest two starting points for the "process" inquiry, one pos-
itive (or descriptive) and one nonnative. The positive starting point is 
an inquiry into the rule's current functions: Why has the law awarded 
the entitlement in question to this holder? Why up to this time has 
the entitlement been protected by a "veto right" property rule? Also, 
whatever the original purpose of the entitlement, what functions are 
now served by the entitlement and by the use of a property rule to 
protect it? The descriptive inquiry is largely a question of consistency 
with current law and practice. 
The normative starting point goes beyond the status quo to ask 
whether these historic purposes and current functions are in fact desir-
able. However, since the choice of norms is inevitably a matter of 
deep controversy, the constraints of space caution us against attempt-
ing to specify (even preliminarily) a choice of normative criteria. 
Whatever the applicable norms, however, they deserve to be applied 
to the process issue of incommensurability as well as to the more stan-
dard policy questions. 
Assuming the functions served by the entitlement and its prop-
erty rule are considered legitimate under applicable norms, the next 
task would be to address the extent to which these functions would be 
undermined if the entitlement-holder lost her right to decide if the 
entitlement is or is .not commensurable with money. As one example 
of applying these steps in the analysis, consider the familiar argument 
of law and economics practitioners that most common law property 
entitlements were granted for reasons of economics, and that property 
entitlements today continue to serve economic functions. According 
to this view, property rights are granted to provide incentives, and the 
"invisible hand" ensures that property owners function as good stew-
ards to maximize social economic value. Assume for the moment that 
this was in fact the origin and function of a property right at issue, and 
that this economic stewardship approach satisfied the relevant norma-
tive inquiry. If so, then it would seem that (in the particular case) the 
"process" issue of incommensurability would largely drop out of the 
calculation of whether the entitlement should be protected by prop-
erty rule or liability rule. That is, the more economic the reasons for 
granting and honoring a particular right, the more likely it will be ac-
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ceptable to take away from the holder the choice of whether to mone-
tize it.54 
At least four interrelated subissues remain to be canvassed. First, 
who is the holder of the right, a human individual or a corporate "per-
son"? Though corporations occasionally hold rights that are not easily 
monetizable (consider, for example, a university's right to decide 
whom to tenure), for most corporations their primary function is a 
monetary one. The more monetary the holder's purposes, other 
things being equal, the less weighty becomes their claim under the 
"process" inquiry. 
This is related to the second subissue: the nature of the resource. 
For example, does it appear to be personal or nonpersonal, wedding 
rings as inventory or wedding rings as heirlooms?55 The more per-
sonal, the less likely it is to be monetizable. 
A third subissue is relative importance, that is, how important is 
the resource at issue to the holder (whether that holder happens to be 
corporate or human) in relation to the holder's other interests. The 
more relative importance the resource has, the more likely it is that 
abrogation of the holder's rights over it will change the holder's valua-
tion of a host of other items. (Consider for example the importance of 
health: it may be more difficult to enjoy diamonds, and easier to en-
joy leisure, when one's health is in jeopardy.) Thus, the more impor-
tant the resource to the person holding the entitlement, the more 
likely it is that only that person can accurately decide whether or· not 
the entitlement is commensurable with other values. 
The fourth subissue concerns the implications that the property 
rule holds for other social practices.56 For instance, if the medical pro-
fession sought the right to monetize valuable organs at will, how 
would that affect our overall habits, such as people's willingness to 
visit their doctors when ill? For a more general possibility, if rights 
that people have become accustomed to controlling through "prop-
54. For another example, consider instances when the reason for the proposed abroga-
tion of an entitlement is that the lawmakers no longer think the entitlement is a good right 
to have. Consider, for example, the husband's right to control the property of his wife 
under the old rules of "femme couvert." If a contemporary lawmaker's judgment about 
the fundamental undesirability of this spousal entitlement satisfied whatever criteria were 
set by the relevant normative standard, it would be absurd to care whether or not the 
holder felt that the right he was losing was incommensurable. Note that in both examples, 
the inquiry involves a normative judgment by whoever is making the inquiry, and not just 
consistency with practice or with the prior or present preferences of lawmakers. 
55. See, e.g., Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
Note that although the substantive "tradeability" of particular items is relevant to the pro-
cess inquiry, the two issues are not identical. 
56. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 30; Sunstein, supra note 30. 
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erty rules" became increasingly vulnerable to sale without their con-
sent, how would that trend affect the community's dignity, sense of 
security, or its overall incentives?57 
Now we shall apply these guidelines to the mandated access pro-
visions of the 1992 Cable Act. 
B. Application 
When applying these guidelines, a preliminary task is to identify 
the affected entitlement. In the case of the mandated access provi-
sions, the affected entitlement is the copyright holder's exclusive right 
over a program, in particular, the right of public performance. The 
functions of this entitlement must be assessed from a positive and nor-
mative perspective. 
From a positive (descriptive) perspective, the purposes of Ameri-
can copyright law are almost entirely instrumental. For example, the 
Constitution itself uses the language of incentives when it empowers 
Congress to grant intellectual property rights.58 To the extent that 
such an economic approach to copyright is normatively acceptable, 
this factor suggests that the copyright holder's "process" interest is 
likely to be minimal. Monetizability is not an issue; the only issue is 
how much money.59 
Even if one questioned the normative appropriateness of the eco-
nomic approach to copyright, the holder's process interest does not 
seem much more weighty even if one instead employs alternative 
norms. For example, in looking at intellectual property from either a 
corrective justice or Lockean "desert" perspective, it appears that 
rights to reward are far more justifiable than are rights of control.60 
And, from the perspective of privacy, what is at issue under the man-
dated access provisions is not the publication of a diary, preliminary 
57. In his classic study of the "takings" clause, Professor Michelman suggested that too 
many uncompensated takings would produce "demoralization costs." Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). Too many compensated takings may have a 
similar effect. 
58. "To promote the progress of Science and the Useful Arts .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8. 
59. I do not mean to under-emphasize the question of "how much" money should be 
paid. As Calabresi & Melamed stress, supra note 24, the difficulty of valuation by third 
parties provides one of the best arguments for a market governed by property rules. But 
our concern is to explicate a different sort of argument. 
60. See Gordon, supra note 48, at 258-66 (corrective justice); Wendy J. Gordon, A 
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intel-
lectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1573-76 (1993) (Lockean theory). 
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draft, or otherwise private writing; television programs are intended 
for public performance. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that rights of control might deserve 
independent respect, a copyright holder may be in a better position to 
claim a "process" interest than otherwise appears. This is particularly 
true if the statute is interpreted to forbid the copyright holder from 
even controlling the initial transmission of her program.61 Perhaps the 
statute will be interpreted to avoid such problems. 
As for the subissues identified above, they would not seem to 
change the calculus much. The holder of a copyright may be either a 
person or a corporation, but given the nature of the work (a program 
intended for television) the holder's "personal" connection with it is 
likely to be implicated only by issues of distortion-and the statute 
does not permit distributors to distort or otherwise alter the programs. 
As for the importance of the resource to the holder, this is likely to be 
economic, so that as long as the compensation paid is sufficient, what 
is important to the holder will be largely preserved. Similarly, al-
lowing mandated access would not seem to have deleterious conse-
quences for our overall social practices, except insofar as any 
abrogation of property rules may have some demoralization effect. 62 
Taken together, the process factor at stake in the mandated ac-
cess context seems weak at best. Hopefully, the above analysis 
(though preliminary) can' suggest that some of the concerns about the 
slippery slope of "licenses to steal" are overstated, and that Congress 
in this portion of the 1992 Cable Act did not flout the process issues 
we have identified. In other words, if Congress in the mandated ac-
cess provisions acted to further the public interest, it did not do so at 
the expense of a significant "process" private interest. 
61. For one example, consider extortion. If any multichannel distributor is at liberty 
to deliver the program to its audience without the consent of the copyright proprietor, 
there may be a danger that a distributor will use a form of legal blackmail. "So you have 
plans for a coordinated nationwide advertising blitz centered around a particular premiere 
date for your program? I'll ruin it with a cheapie preview unless you pay me." Such extor-
tion attempts would be, to say the least, wasteful, and-more to the point for this Article-
would be insulting to the dignity of the copyright holder. See Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and 
Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (1993) 
(giving an overview of the blackmail literature and analyzing the results from both a conse-
quentialist and deontological perspective). 
62. See Michelman, supra note 57. 
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VI 
Conclusion 
245 
Perhaps, because the Founders adopted a "takings" clause for 
property, or perhaps because of the growing influence of the law and 
economics movement,63 lawmakers seem to have become fairly accus-
tomed to the notion that it may be proper to mandate the transforma-
tion of property into money. But the takings clause as interpreted has 
a limited reach, and the limitations of law and economics have be-
come more obvious as the movement has grown more popular. Law-
yers have increasingly turned to discussing whether all property is 
exchangeable for money, and to discussing the larger philosophic 
question of whether all our values are commensurable along a com-
mon metric. 
The legal literature on incommensurability has usefully suggested 
that many substantive values are not exchangeable in money. Yet, a 
dearth of attention has been paid to the possibility that there might be 
some value in an individual having the right to decide what is or is not 
commensurable in money, regardless of how the substantive issue of 
commensurability might be resolved. 
Usually monetizability seems to be discussed as if it were proper 
to subsume this "process" issue into a discussion of the substantive 
question. The assumption seems to be that it is solely up to the ob-
server (the scholar, policymaker, or lawmaker) 'to decide whether or 
not a given resource is commensurable with money. Once the scholar, 
judge, or legislator has determined that the item at stake is monetiz-
able, attention turns to how its monetary value can best be deter-
mined: Whether the highest-valued use can best be discovered by 
enforcing "property rules" and by relying on the market, or whether a 
better determination can be effectuated through some type of govern-
mental regulation. 
That is, only after the commensurability issue is resolved in favor 
of monetizability does the law and economics literature recommend 
that decisionmakers undertake a "process" inquiry. In our view, how-
ever, the locus of decisionmaking power should be a focus of attention 
at an earlier stage as well. 
One of the many functions served by "property rules" is to ensure 
that property owners have the power to make their own decisions as 
to what is, and is not, commensurable with money. We argue that this 
"process" function can be sufficiently important that, in order to pre-
serve it, the law should avoid transforming property rules into liability 
63. See Radin, supra note 30. 
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rules in certain contexts. Accordingly, legislatures and courts need 
guidance in determining when this property-rule function can be 
safely dispensed with, and when it needs to be preserved. 
In this Article, we have suggested a preliminary and tentative set 
of guidelines for approaching this process issue, and we have applied 
those guidelines to the 1992 Cable Act's mandated access provisions. 
We conclude that the process aspect of the commensurability issue 
should be resolved in the statute's favor. 
